The logic of modesty—why it pays to be humble

humble
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Why do people make anonymous donations, and why does the public perceive this as admirable? Why do we downplay our interest in a potential partner if we risk missing out on a relationship? A team of scientists, consisting of Christian Hilbe, a postdoc at the Institute Science and Technology Austria (IST Austria), Moshe Hoffman, and Martin Nowak, both at Harvard University, has developed a novel game theoretic model that captures these behaviors and enables their study. Their new model is the first to include the idea that hidden signals, when discovered, provide additional information about the sender. They use this idea to explain under which circumstances people have an incentive to hide their positive attributes.

People often take actions that may be costly at first, but lead to reputational benefits in the long run. However, if good reputations are important, why are there numerous situations in which people hide accomplishments or good characteristics, like when we donate anonymously? Similarly, we often emphasize subtlety in art or fashion, avoid appearing over-eager, or otherwise obscure something positive. Why do others consider this behavior commendable? The team's key insight into this societal puzzle is that "burying" a signal (i.e. obscuring information) is a signal in and of itself. This additional signal can have several interpretations: for instance, the sender may be unconcerned with those who might have been impressed, but who miss subtle messages (like an artist disregarding the philistine masses). Alternatively, the sender might be confident that those who matter to them will find out anyway (for instance, only those who have the taste and/or necessary wealth will recognize a designer bag without an obvious logo).

The scientists succeeded in formalizing these ideas in a new evolutionary game theory model they call the "signal-burying game," which they detail in a paper published today in Nature Human Behaviour. In this game, there are different types of senders (high, medium, and low), and different types of receivers (selective and unselective). The sender and the receiver do not know the other's type. To convey their type, senders may pay a cost to send a signal. Signals may be sent clearly or be buried. When a signal is buried, it has a lower probability of being observed by any kind of receiver. In particular, buried signals entail the risk that receivers will never learn that the sender has sent a signal at all. After the sender has made his decision, receivers decide whether or not to engage in an economic interaction with the sender. The game has an element of risk, and therefore, senders and receivers must develop strategies to maximize their payoff.

"We wanted to understand what strategies would evolve naturally and be stable," explains Christian Hilbe, co-first author of the paper and postdoc in the research group of Krishnendu Chatterjee at IST Austria. "In particular, is it possible to have a situation where high-level senders always choose to bury their signals, mid-level senders always send a clear signal, and low-level senders send no signal at all?" This would correspond to situations that come up in real life, and is one of the key distinguishing features of their model: They allow for strategies that target specific receivers at the risk of losing others. In their simulations, players started off neither sending nor receiving signals. Then, with some probability, a player either selects a random strategy (representing mutation) or imitates another player (representing a learning process biased towards strategies with higher payoff). In their simulations, the scientists found that populations quickly settled at the strategy described above.

The team also developed several extensions to the model, enabling them to cover more general scenarios. First, they added different levels of obscurity: senders could choose from several revelation probabilities. "We found that in this case, high senders tend to be modest... but not too modest," adds Hilbe. "Even if you're humble, you don't try to be holier-than-thou." It is moreover possible to increase the number of types of senders and receivers, as well as introduce subtleties in the preferences of the receivers.

Using their , Hilbe, Hoffman, and Nowak were able to put a different perspective on various common situations: a donor giving anonymously, an academic not disclosing their degree, an artist creating art with hidden messages, and a possible partner hiding their interest, among others. Evolutionary game theory shows that, in the end, these puzzling social behaviors make sense.


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More information: Moshe Hoffman et al, The signal-burying game can explain why we obscure positive traits and good deeds, Nature Human Behaviour (2018). DOI: 10.1038/s41562-018-0354-z
Journal information: Nature Human Behaviour

Citation: The logic of modesty—why it pays to be humble (2018, May 28) retrieved 23 July 2019 from https://phys.org/news/2018-05-logic-modestywhy-humble.html
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May 29, 2018
All these seem to assume that the donation itself is worthless to the sender unless they manage to signal their virtue.

The giver can be thankful enough to make the donation in the first place, finding it a good investment without leveraging it for further social purposes. If you went to academia to learn things, you don't necessarily need to brag about your titles at all because what diplomas you hold is irrelevant to the question.

May 29, 2018
But Eikka... now you've sent a signal... doh... now I sent one too.... doh... I did it again... time to crawl back under my rock before ... doh!

While this is interesting, I have problems with the fact of nowadays that many theories and models resting on nothing but an assumed core incentive of humans wanting to maximise their reputation. As far as modesty and the closely related plainness are concerned, their characteristic is that once well advanced, they liberate their bearer from seeking and appreciating a fuss of him/her as a person, from depending on personal attention, praise, prestige, reassurances etc., further on from striving for immense material values, and from a wild graving for pleasures. Learning modesty and plainness deserves educational and afterwards self-educational efforts from early childhood onwards. That because their rewards are tremendous by them also serving as foundation for other important virtues (kindheartedness, feelings for others, harmony, venerability and so on) to evolve for ultimately the benefit of everyone.

Jun 03, 2018
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Zoe, you make the right suggestion: studying all aspects of nature, for learning what we humans have long unlearned. So, let us look at your example of prawns. They hunt when they really need food, never just killing for the fun of it or for showing off. They are not seeking dominance and power in their niche of animal kingdom, rather respectful and harmonic coexistence with other species. Their modest and simple life is in balance without extreme behavior patterns. And in that context, it is worth to clarify that modesty is not the same as shyness.

Jun 04, 2018
i'm humble & proud of it

Jun 04, 2018
People often take actions that may be costly at first, but lead to reputational benefits in the long run.

I think the article is missing a very basic thing, here. A hidden signal is not intended as a signal. It is not supposed to be uncovered. An anonymous donation or a secret action for the benefit of others is made because the actor sees no point in making it public - not because he is expecting accolades down the line. (e.g. when parents do something for their child they aren't doing this with the express intent so that the child will thank them later)

No one is calculating the probability of a secret action being discovered in real life and adjusts their actions accordingly.


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